


SOLOMON EXPERIENCE: Strengthening the Recovery Process


Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction "Big Ocean. Small Islands- Addressing Disaster Risk in the Pacific Region"

Wednesday 17th June 2009



Earthquake & Tsunami (2 Apr. 2007)

- Magnitude: 8.1
- Epicenter: Southeast of Gizo
- Casualty: 52 dead
- Worst affected areas: Gizo, Simbo, Ranongga, central southern coast of Choiseul



ESTIMATED INTENSITY	L,	11-111	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	1X	X+
PEAK VEL.(cm/s)	<0.1	0.1-1.1	1.1-3.4	3.4-8.1	8.1-16	16-31	31-60	60-116	>116
PEAK ACC.(%g)	<.17	.17-1.4	1.4-3.9	3.9-9.2	9.2-18	18-34	34-65	65-124	>124
POTENTIAL DAMAGE Vuinerable Structures	none	none	none	Light	Moderate	Moderate/Heavy	Heavy	V. Heavy	V. Heavy
POTENTIAL DAMAGE Resistant Structures	none	none	none	V. Light	Light	Moderate	Moderate/Heavy	Heavy	V. Heavy
PERCEIVED SHAKING	Not felt	Weak	Light	Moderate	Strong	Very strong	Severe	Violent	Extreme



Summary of Impacts:

 Human: 52 fatalities; 4,000 families displaced; interruption of social services (Education & Health); immeasurable psychological impact; fear of disease outbreaks

Economic:


- Destruction of workplaces, infrastructure
- Tourist resorts affected
- Damaged or destroyed food gardens, crops
- Loss of Livelihood: crops, livestock, access to sea/roads

Natural:

- Damages to reefs, shorelines, buildings, caused landslides, uplifting of land mass etc
- Marine resources affected
- Gardens destroyed
- Fish poisoning
- Infrastructure: includes damage to wharves, roads and bridges, water supply.
- 60% of recurrent budget of SB Government

Recovery Phase





The Context: Disaster Management Institutional Arrangements

- The DM Plan was quite well structured
- However, it was too general and accountabilities are not explicit (except for the NDC)
- There was also a lack of clearly defined standard procedures or working groups
- Sector ministries were uncertain of their roles and reluctant to acknowledge their responsibilities
- Limited resources made it easy for agencies to step back and avoid commitment

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Recovery Action Plan

- One plan to facilitate national and international agency programmes
- Coordinated by TAT
- Key Components
 - Education
 - Health
 - Infrastructure
 - Agriculture
 - Government Housing
 - Shelter and Housing (separate Shelter Strategy developed)

Recovery Process: Key Issues

Two years on: slow progress on recovery and rehabilitation

- Capacity: first time dealing with a disaster of this scale
- Commitment: the TAT met but members often did not attend, and responsible agencies avoided their commitments

Recovery Process: Key Issues cont.

- Political Pressures: Cabinet and the political process were disengaged with other pressures at the time
- Budget Allocations: the formal SIG 2008 budget process did not address recovery issues
- Donor engagement: this needed to be sustained throughout the response and recovery phases – although this may have been due to their reluctance to engage without Government commitment

Recovery Process: Key Issues (cont.)

- Coordination: coordination structures developed and funded for managing government and non-government agencies, but ineffective due to the issues above
- Disaster Risk Reduction: international infrastructure projects did not address risk reduction because of perceived costs and the land tenure system

Recovery Process: Key Issues (cont.)

- Baseline and Assessment data: lack of adequate baseline data to provide a platform for damage assessments, as well as lack of standardised assessment frameworks
- Scheduling: initial scheduling was optimistic and key activities, such as sector ministry assessments, took months to undertake
- Shelter issues: not dealt with in line with the agreed strategy

Lessons Learned and Way forward

- Capacity and Commitment: there is acceptance that effective recovery from significant disasters requires Government commitment and adequate capacity to deliver on that commitment
 - 3-year programme of implementation is now being initiated to set terms of reference, SOP's, clusters, agencies and communities
 - Commitment to NAP and NAPA development and implementation

Issues and Lessons Learned

Institutional Structures:

- There is a willingness to address the institutional structures to ensure a more effective recovery process
- The National DM Plan and the related legislation is being reviewed for all aspects of disaster risk management
- Clarified roles and responsibilities of government agencies, through the formation of explicit national cluster groupings
- This is being used to enhance coordination with partners

Examples of Disaster Risk Reduction built in to the Recovery Process

- High Sea-Swells (SI Ontong Java, Dec 08): Recovery
 Action Plan now includes a range of DRR measures: e.g.
 upgrading and improvement to current rain water
 harvesting systems, and introduction of alternate crops
 which are salt resistant)
- Flash Floods (Guadalcanal, Jan-Feb 2009): integration of DRR into community development plan; disaster resilient agricultural practices
- Floods (Fiji, Jan 09): particular focus on the agriculture sector on how capacity can be enhance for preparedness and response measures within the Ministry

Grasping Opportunities for Disaster Risk Reduction through Recovery Processes

- NAP process: a mechanism for incorporating risk reduction into the recovery process, as well as developing appropriate institutional structures for recovery planning and coordination
- Recovery Action Plans: opportunity for more effective support by partners to contribute on sector or thematic specific DRR issues in the recovery process
- Early Recovery Cluster: Pacific Humanitarian
 Team, based on IASC Cluster approach
 e.g. Fiji Floods: exploring ways to build back better